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Some ideas concerning academic budgeting models for a time of change: 
 
Most academic administrators would set out the following budgeting goals: 
 
1) Sufficient funds to achieve excellence while meeting societal demands (for 
graduates, research, service, etc.) 
2) Sufficient funding flexibility to adapt to unforeseen challenges and 
opportunities 
3) Sufficient centralized control of funding allocations to be able to lead (“steer”) 
the institution 
4) Sufficient decentralized control to empower both departments (chairs) and 
provide incentives to individual faculty and push key resource decisions 
down to the level where the best decisions can be made 
5) A transparent budgeting scheme, understood by all, so that incentives are 
apparent (e.g., for excellence, expenditure control) 
 
Beyond that, my own experience suggests several other goals: 
 
1) A highly diverse portfolio of funding resources, so that you are not overly 
dependent on one source (or patron) such as the government 
2) Several flexible “pots of money” that are available to respond to department 
or faculty initiatives (so that if an initiative receives a “no” from one source, it 
can always go to other possible sources) 
3) Strong incentives to stimulate entrepreneurial behavior in the faculty (so that 
they accept a personal responsibility to also seek the resources necessary to 
support their activities) 
4) Strong incentives and accountability for expenditure control (e.g., making the 
costs of low enrollment courses apparent) 
5) If possible, developing substantial reserve funds to respond to unusual 
opportunities or emergencies (e.g., using unexpended funds from earlier 
budgets or building endowment funds through private gifts). 
 
As my book indicates, at the level of the University of Michigan, we took a 
number of steps to diversify our funding sources, build substantial reserves, 
provide strong incentives for faculty entrepreneurial behavior, and push budget 
authority and responsibility to the lowest possible level.  For example: 
 
1) To respond to a stagnant or declining state appropriation ($300 M/y) we 
increased student tuition levels (to $450 M/y), sponsored research grants and 
contracts (to $500 M/y), private gifts (to $180 M/y), and the revenue 
generated by auxiliary activities such as our hospitals and distance education 
(to $1,500 M/y). 
2) We emphasized building large reserve funds both through endowments (now 
at $3 B) and various internal funds from cost containment ($1 B).  (I might 
note that this also allowed the University to achieve the highest Wall Street 
credit rating of AAA, which greatly reduced our borrowing costs.) 
3) We provided strong incentives to faculty to seek external grants and contracts 
for their research both through salary and promotion and also through the 
provision of discretionary funds. 
4) We adopted a budgeting scheme known as “responsibility center 
management” in which all academic and administrative units given authority 
over all of their funds, but also assigned responsibility for generating and 
wisely spending these funds (with subsidy from central funding sources for 
those units unable to enroll sufficient students or generate enough research 
funding or gift income to support their activities, such as the humanities and 
the arts).  Although the central administration provided this decentralized 
control to individual schools, several of our schools extended this still further 
to individual departments. 
 
I am sending along under separate cover some of the early documents from a 
similar effort when I was dean of our College of Engineering in the early 1980s 
(and Chuck Vest, now president of MIT, was my associate dean).  The general 
philosophy is the same, but some of the details were different: 
 
1) Since we needed to increase the PhD and research production of the College, 
we put into place strong faculty incentives for these activities, not only 
through conventional methods such as merit salary programs and promotion 
decisions, but also through an algorithm that provide small discretionary 
fund accounts to each faculty member based on PhD production and 
sponsored research contracts. 
2) We put into place a transparent budgeting system to allocate funds for 
instructional purposes to departments based on their student enrollments 
(which was particularly important for rapidly growing departments such as 
electrical engineering and computer science). 
3) Both the deans and the department chairs assumed personal responsibilities 
as entrepreneurs to seek new funds from external sources such as private 
gifts, government contracts, or industrial support.  We allowed departments 
to retain any such funds they were able to generate. 
4) We made a forceful case to the University’s central administration to modify 
their own budgeting methods to more accurately reflect the level of 
instructional activity (e.g., student enrollments) and research activity 
(sponsored research grants) of the College of Engineering relative to other 
academic units. 
 
Clearly, the academic culture of your institution is considerably different that 
ours in the United States.  However many of the same principles may be 
relevant, such as achieving a more diversified resource portfolio (here, industry 
may be a particularly important opportunity), pushing both the authority for 
budgeting decisions and cost accountability to lower levels (at least to the 
department level), and providing strong incentives for faculty entrepreneurial 
activities. 
 
I hope that some of these ideas are of use to you. 
